MEI Faculty Director Tarek Masoud and MEI Visiting Fellow Karim Haggag in conversation with journalist Mina Al-Oraibi, Editor-in-Chief of" The National."
Episode Contributors:
Guest
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A Conversation with Mina al-Oraibi
Intro: Welcome to a special preview episode of Middle East Matters, a new podcast from the Middle East Initiative at Harvard! We are very excited to share these episodes with you.
Launching in early 2021, this preview episode features our faculty director Tarek Masoud’s conversation with Mina Al-Oraibi, Editor-in-Chief of The National.
To stay up to date on our latest episodes, please be sure to subscribe to Middle East Matters on Apple podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you stream your podcasts!
You can also find it on our website at Belfer Center dot org slash M E I and be sure to follow us on twitter at Middle East underscore H K S.
TM:I am joined in this endeavor as always by my co-host and partner in in virtue, not partner in crime, Karim Haggag of the American University in Cairo School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, which is a co-sponsor of this endeavor. Greetings, Karim.
KH: Tarek, greetings. Thank you and thank you to all the participants joining us today.
TM: So today's guest is one of the Arab world's most distinguished journalists and one of the world's most trenchant commentators on Arab affairs. Mina al-Oraibi is the editor-in-chief of The National, which is a newspaper based in Abu Dhabi that has become one of the best English language sources of news and analysis on the Arab world and on the broader Middle East. Mina has had a rich and varied career. In the very few years in which she's been on this planet, including a stint as the Washington D.C. bureau chief for Asharq Al-Awsat, which is one of the largest circulation Arabic language newspapers, and this is a publication for which she also served as assistant editor-in-chief. She has interviewed countless newsmakers and broken really important stories, particularly on the ongoing saga in Iraq of which she is a native and where she spent a chunk of her globetrotting childhood. Mina is such a journalist of distinction and renown that she's been recognized by many global organizations. She is a young global leader of the World Economic Forum. She's a member of the board of trustees for the American University in Iraq in Sulaymaniyah, and she is also a former Yale world fellow. So we are really in the presence of a very distinguished and special person. We’re really thrilled that she could join us. Thank you, Mina.
MO: Thank you Tarek. You're very kind. What a lovely introduction.
TM: Okay so let's get into our discussion. We wanted to start Mina with a discussion of how you see the state of the United States right now. You know, I’ve been watching obsessively, as most of our viewers and listeners probably have been to the latest twists and turns in the election, and here we are two days after the election. We still don't know who has won, and even though this is a moment of high anxiety, it's merely one moment of high anxiety in what to me feels like four years of moments of high anxiety. And so, you're somebody who's been watching the United States for a long time. What would you say has most surprised you about the last four years in this country?
MO: Wow, the last four years have been quite the roller coaster, and I’m sure for many Americans, it has been a roller coaster emotionally, politically, economically. Of course, when we agreed on the date of the 5th of November, we thought we would be talking about the next president or a second term for the Trump presidency. And here we are not really knowing where we're going to go. So the roller coaster continues. But I guess what's most surprising in the last four years is that constant shock that we would have about something that president Trump would say or an accusation that would come about that, you know, maybe eight years ago would have stopped the news cycle, would have led to resignations, would have led to perhaps investigations. And so that change in what is acceptable politically, what is acceptable in political discourse in the United States, that surprised me. I mean that I find most surprising, not the exact events in themselves or the statements in themselves, but that there are no real repercussions. And I think again, what we're seeing with the elections and the very narrow margins between the Democrats and the Republicans is that for a lot of people, it's acceptable. And actually, the fact that Donald Trump has been able to get more votes shows you that he is popular, and this wasn't tablet. And you know, certain people analyzed the 2016 election a certain way, and this shows that it wasn't a blip. The 2018 congressional midterms also showed it wasn't a blip, but this is really a confirmation of that. So I find that actually quite surprising that it is such a narrow difference. But again, you know, my native country is Iraq, but my adopted home is the U.K. And when I look at what's happened to politics in the United Kingdom, the fact that unfortunately at the moment the prime minister is somebody who acknowledges that he lied during the Brexit campaign, and yet there is no accountability for that and that's now accepted politically also surprises me.
TM: Do you have a diagnosis for why this change has happened? Why is it that we are now in a universe in which you can have political leaders who lie with impunity, and their supporters still love them. And they still come within a hair's breadth of winning re-election.
MO: You know, it's a number of things. A lot of people have analyzed it. I think part of it is that people have a sort of resentment for what they consider to be the establishment, whatever that means. There's a sense that politics in both the U.K. and the U.S. hasn't delivered on people's aspirations. Somehow, somebody like Donald Trump or Boris Johnson— both
gentlemen are very entitled and have lived very privileged lives can say that they are outsiders, even though they are from the very heart of the establishment, especially the privilege that that both have enjoyed throughout their lives. And yet they can come and say we're different, and it's really we've gone from the soundbite era to an era of say the most outrageous thing, break norms and precedence. And that's supposed to be change rather than actual tangible reform or political change. And part of it is 24-hour news cycles and social media and a way to change the public discourse in a way that allows some of that to happen. And we could talk about this for many hours, you know, the impact of what people see as globalization and a threat to their identity. And so wanting someone that says yes I feel that pain. I agree with you, and you know, pretending that you can hark back to an era that really has passed us. The world has progressed for good or bad, and somehow, people want that to hear politicians that will say to you we can change this. We can take you back to a time when you felt safe and enclosed away from all the changes that are around you. And I don't think many of our societies have figured out how to deal with the incredible changes and the speed of change that we're living through.
KH: So Mina, if I could just to pose a follow-up to that. I mean given this unpredictability in American politics and everything that has accompanied it, the polarization, the unrest in American cities, the inability to deal with the pandemic, and now of course, the current uncertainty in the elections. Is it your view that all of this has undermined America's reputation in the Middle East? And by that I mean both in terms of those in the region that look to America as a model to aspire to and those that look to the United States as a superpower for protection or for addressing the region's many problems.
MO: You know, I think the latter part, the idea of a superpower and looking to United States to address its problems, that's probably changed some time ago. Partly—and I did promise that I’d not continuously come back to Iraq— but you can't take away the fact that what happened in Iraq from 2003 onwards change people's idea of the United States, not necessarily just because of the 2003 war itself but how the occupation was conducted, and the colossal failures that happened there I think made people realize hang on we thought this is a superpower that would sweep in and, you know, like remodel the country, even if they disagreed with the premise upon which the war was launched to start with. But still that, you know, failure changed quite a few people's minds, and then I think during the Obama administration, everything from, you know, Syria—I’m sure most of the people listening to us here have heard this many a time—the red line in Syria that then was crossed. Nobody seemed to care in a differing amount. There was no real sense of the United States being interested in acting in the superpower or actually using the power that it does have and influence. And so of course, then again, the Trump administration that's another chapter. But then the COVID-19—I don't know what to call it except disaster on many levels, and the way that it was mishandled in the U.S. made people think the first part of your question, think about okay the actual ability to deliver for their own people. Forget about this, you know, role in the world. And this is a philosophical question, does the U.S. want to be the world's policemen or not etc.? This is about the competence and the ability of the United States to deliver for its people, and I think that's made a lot of people pause. Yes for, sure.
TM: You know, the natural follow-up to that is you know broaden a little bit beyond the reputation of the United States, and what do you think that the last four years have done if anything to the Arab perception of democracy as a desirable form of government?
MO: I mean I think the last four years in the United States have in some ways made people question democracy, but also again, things that have happened in the region have questioned people about the ability of actually the ballot box solving much at all. And I think it's more, you know, the importance of institutions—people have thought about that, and I think the way —I mean this is part of the reason these elections are so important. Will the institutions be able to maintain what is left of their resilience in the face of Donald Trump's aspirations? That would be something to watch, and so I think that in a way will make people question how much American institutions would stand all the chipping away that's happened over the last four years.
But I think, again, the view of democracy in some ways—yes, what happens in the United States impacts people. But it's again, when people look towards Brexit, there is a general sense in our world why would you want to leave the European Union? And well, it's a referendum. People voted that way despite the fact that it wasn't, you know, well-informed people about how the actual process would happen, so that's raised a lot of questions. And I think in the United States, the question is about the impact that not only the president can have but the impact about ideology and the fact that we see those divisions in the United States being very ideological now, rather than these are policy programs, this is what people will deliver. Watching the debates, you know, people would pay attention, not everybody, but quite a few. People would pay attention to what happens with the debates and previous presidential elections. And you know, that's what you want to see in other in more countries in the region, where people are actually debating ideas, and this is what we want to implement for our people and this is our policy program. And he didn't have that this time around and last time round too, but especially this time around, it was much more, you know, personal attacks and so forth. So you know, that's disappointing, but it almost feels, you know, the amount of— I’m sure many of you have seen some of the jokes in the Middle East going around like, you know, we now have to teach the Americans how to do this. We have to teach Americans how to have political discourse, and we have to teach Americans how to do elections. And you know, it's said with a lot of cynicism, of course and somewhat disappointing.
KH: Yeah, so this obviously has implications for the role that the United States has traditionally played in the region, and it seems to be that the widespread consensus that that role is changing. I mean some characterize it as a withdrawal from the Middle East. Some characterize it as a diminishment of American influence in the region. So how does the region adjust to this given that the United States has played such an outsized role in our region? How does the Middle East adjust?
MO: You know, I moved to the UAE three and a half years ago, and it was actually the first time that I lived in the Arab world as an adult. You know, I left as a child, and living here has told me a lot more, even though I used to visit. You know, every month I’d come to the region. But living here, I realized how different the Middle East and the Arab world is from one country to another, and the circumstances between so many Arab countries are so different today. And whether that's because of their own domestic situations whether it's because of the alliances they have, it's much more varied today than I think 10 years ago, 15 years ago. So it's hard to give an answer, you know. I want to give you a nuanced answer almost, so it's hard to give a general sweep.
Also because it didn't start with Donald Trump. You know, the Obama administration made it very clear that they wanted out they wanted to pull back. You know, people who follow American development, society, so forth realize that there's also fatigue in the United States from war in Afghanistan, more than Iraq war. And so unfortunately, this idea that American military disengagement leads to American political disengagement is of concern, especially for the countries that are impacted militarily, and that doesn't mean just, you know, Iraq and Afghanistan but also, you know, countries in the Gulf where actually American military security guarantees and so forth come with heavy political engagement. But what we saw during the Obama administration and parts of the Trump administration is this idea that we want to pull back our troops. And that came with more political disengagement, which is concerning because frankly, nobody particularly wants to have American military presence, but what they've realized is that Americans don't have troops on the ground. They're not really going to be that engaged.
And of course, ISIS and that whole period of time with ISIS, you know, was proof that in the end, it needed to be an American-led coalition that came in and really and really galvanized the countries that were needed to be galvanized in order to end ISIS, at least territorial control, in the region. So it shows you that when needed, America still can use that power when it wants to, and so, I think this is a very long-winded way to answer very complex questions. But to say that, I think in the region, there is an understanding that when the United States wants to be involved, they will be and they are still the greatest superpower. The problem is they're busy. They're not interested. There was that whole conversation about the Asia pivot during the Obama administration, which I think frankly if it hadn't been for ISIS, probably would have been much more pronounced than we would have seen it.
And again, people in this region are very aware of the rise of China, and that's you know—I think often in the United States that has a very negative tone. In this part of the world, it's a mixed reaction to it, and there's a sense of there is this rising superpower. It will counterbalance, but culturally what we're familiar with is the United States. It's beginning to very slowly change in certain parts of the Gulf that are getting to know, training more on the people-to-people relationship. And again, we see it here in the UAE much more. But generally, in the Arab world, China really isn't that well known, and so for them it's more comfortable. And you know the, United States is almost like the devil you know. And so there is that sense, but I think this engagement is concerning because there's a sense if there's a vacuum, someone's going to fill it. It's going to be the Russians, which we kind of saw in Syria. They're going to be the Chinese. The Europeans are quite disengaged.
Of course, you would hope that that vacuum is actually filled by countries of the region, and we do see certain countries have much stronger or more robust foreign policies than they did again 15 years ago. And that is partly driven by the United States saying I want to see regional countries taking care of their own backyards, and again, that didn't start with the Trump administration. It's been happening for some time. You know, I do think that in some ways, the so-called forever wars in Afghanistan, Iraq have had such a toll on the United States— not only domestically but also their image—and people understand the United States wants to pull back. They worry about an isolationist America because again, who's going to play that role.
TM: So if you look, Mina, at the two candidates who are, you know, currently vying for the presidency—although I guess with every minute, it becomes clearer who's going to win— which of them represents the greater prospect for the type of American engagement in the region that you want to see?
MO: That I want to see?
TM: Yeah.
MO: You know, I’m, again, [a] single issue voter. If I was a single issue— Iraq. I’m very concerned about the possibility of a Biden presidency because of the position that Joe Biden took as senator in 2006, 2007 where he advocated for the breakup of Iraq, and he had, you know, the famous op-ed in the New York Times, 2006. And then 2007, you know, was at the UN trying to lobby countries to support this idea and you know, this crude division of Iraqis along Sunnis, Shia, Kurds, even though the country, of course, is much more varied than those three groupings. And also, those three groupings don't necessarily want to live in these boring homogeneous entities to be created. And there was a similar kind of approach towards Syria that really wasn't a sectarian conflict and continues not to be a sectarian conflict. It's not about sectarianism, but especially as it began, there was a different approach. And Vice President Biden and the people who worked closely with him really didn't see it that way. So there's a concern that we get an administration that looks to the region as Sunni, Arabs, and Shia, which I think is terrible for the region. That's not how we really are, and you know, President Obama spoke in those very terms many a time.
TM: Doesn't Trump also speak in those terms though Mina?
MO: Well, this is what I was going to say. Donald Trump doesn't actually speak about Sunni, Arabs, and Shia. Partly, I think he's not interested, like it doesn't go into that much complexity and detail and is much more transactional. And I think this is the difference. The Trump administration— if there is going to be a President Trump. So on the one side, the image of Joe Biden, we'll see what he's like as president. We'll see what lessons have been learned, and I think certain people that are close to the Joe Biden team have learned lessons, and you know, do understand some of those things that happened during the Obama administration. We haven't talked about Iran which we will come to. They will be different.
With Donald Trump, it's just much more transactional. It's crude, but in some ways, because people have felt so disappointed in the United States, they're almost like yeah, I can deal with that better. Don't try to fool me. Don't try to tell me that you care about my welfare. You don't. I mean this is what many people on the street will say. You know, people will say, you know, this thing of the United States saying we are value based. Well then how do you explain so many policies, both parties, whether it's Guantanamo, whether it's Iraq, whether etc. So people unfortunately feel disillusioned, despite loving the concept of what the United States stands for, you know, everything from this idea of aspiring for happiness, aspiring for constitutional rule etc. All of it is not actually happening on the ground, and so I think that tarnished image of the United States, which again I repeat genuinely is not just the last four years. But the last four years crystalized. The strongest image is then, you know, reflected on what people are expecting from the United States. So with Donald Trump, it was almost like what you see is what you get. I’m going to tell you. I’m going to do this. You don't like it, but at least I’m not trying to sugarcoat it for you. And it was almost —I don't want to use the word refreshing because that's the wrong term. But it was almost like okay, at least I can deal with you. That transaction is now.
There is concern of course about Donald Trump and many of the actions that he takes, but on the flip side, there was a sense of he understands the concerns that many Arabs in the region have. And again, I think certain people think it's only the Gulf countries. But actually no. You know, from Lebanon to Iraq to Syria, the concerns about Iran's aspirations and expansionism in the region that really under the Obama administration was swept under the carpet. You know, I would interview officials in the Obama administration, and when you raise this concern about Tehran, what are the Iranian regime's expansionist plans, whether it's in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and otherwise, but particularly Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, it was never taken seriously. And it was the sense of oh there you go. The Arabs are just scared of this, you know, non-existent spooky man. Where the reality is, you know, from the militias to the weakening of the economies of these countries etc. It wasn't taken seriously, and of course, the year and a half of secret talks that were happening with the Iranians, you know, you had Arab officials that were meeting with senior level Obama officials that were saying yes. Just the European—they're speaking with the Iranians and everything, and suddenly these talks were actually happening in the backyard in Oman, in secret, which, you know, of course understandable that a country wants to go and negotiate in secret, so things don't get leaked and so forth. At the same time, you have your decades-old allies suddenly feel like oh my god. You've thrown this under the bus.
And of course again, I bring up Syria. I think the Syrian people were genuinely betrayed, and you had the Obama administration saying one thing publicly and promising opposition one thing. And behind the scenes, having different agenda and really prioritizing the nuclear deal. With Trump, you know, this idea of saying, you know, nobody wants confrontation. Really, we don't need another war. So I think this idea whenever people thought oh my god this could get to more status. Nobody wanted that, but there was a sense of at least tell the Iranian regime that its expansionist policies wouldn't be accepted. You know, the strike against us and Soleimani in January— nobody would have thought that would happen. That changed the dynamic inside of Iraq in certain ways and also changed the dynamic of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard inside and what they're trying to do in the region. Again, is this the way to solve things? No, but it's a different dynamic, and for people in the region that are genuinely concerned about Iran, there's a sense that at least we have a change in tone where it isn't just let's appease the Iranian government or the officials. Let's actually, you know, deal with these very serious problems, especially on the militia side.
Now in the middle of all of this— and I will stop talking because I know you have other questions—we had the developments in Iraq and Lebanon where you had a genuine grassroots movement of young Iraqis and young Lebanese going out, demanding reform, demanding change. You've had the incredible changes in Sudan where, again, very brave young people going out. And you know, I think many of us can't believe we're coming to 10 years since the uprisings and, you know, of course Tunisia and then Egypt and then Syria and so forth and everything that's happened since then. And so to see another wave like that, and what does that mean? And in some ways seeing the U.S., not claiming to care and lead the movement and then abandon people halfway through, it's almost like okay guys we're going to have to try to figure this out ourselves. But at least there was that push domestically, and I think it's a healthy movement that's happened in both Iraq and Lebanon that we have yet to see. But the outcome of it will be impacted greatly by what the next American administration does with Iran, in more ways than one. So you know, it's a wait and see moment, but still I would say that the United States has so much more power than at the moment it is using, and that power is not the mighty military power because we know we can use what it wants. But actually, yes and Algeria too, Sultan—thank you. Sorry I forgot. And so I think the United States does have a certain power of influence of diplomacy, can convene, and the Trump administration hasn't been interested.
TM: The question was to ask you to compare Trump and Biden. So you want a U.S. that uses its diplomacy to convene etc. So quickly, Biden, Trump, which one is more likely to do that?
MO: Oh, Biden for sure, but I’m saying like the jury's out of whether they're interested in doing that.
TM: Right. You know, the point that you raise about Iran, and then I know Karim wants to jump in. But just very quickly because you do identify a real distinction between the two parties really on their view of Iran. And I think, you know, the criticism of Obama in the Arab world was that he didn't take Iran seriously, or in fact, may even have had a soft spot towards the Iranians and
looked with disdain upon some of the Gulf countries. Do you think that this is a correct read of the difference between these two parties? And it sounds like you do. But then if you do think it's a correct read, where do you think that comes from?
MO: Wow, okay. Trying to figure out where the Obama administration's approach on Iran comes from is something that I actually tried to do quite a lot. And you know, there's
how do I say this? Okay let me try to explain that. I think genuinely there were certain people on the Obama team that thought that Iran is a great civilization and that given the chance, you know, this whole thing of, you know, they love rock and roll, and if only, you know, we opened up a bit to them, they'd love us as Americans. And they really would be our natural allies. And I think actually the Iranian people, you know, just like anybody else, would want to have decent relationships with their neighbors before they had great relations with the Americans, but also have suffered so much from their regime but also sanctions and so forth. And I have to say, I’m one of those people that detest sanctions again because of what they did to Iraq and what it does to people. It never really actually harms governments. And on the contrary, helps smugglers and so forth. And so under the Obama administration, there was a tightening of sanctions on the Iranian people. And then there was, of course, these talks. And think there was a sense with Obama administration firstly that these are great people, and actually, we should open up with the government. And they were, of course, so against regime change. And so they said the only way is to be able to talk with these guys.
Second, it was clear that the administration came in wanting to make deals with our enemies. And in some ways, they're quite similar to the Trump administration with that of trying to strike deals with our enemies and getting this legacy.
And then third, I think there was a sense of, again, this very sectarian view. That it's Sunni and Shia. And actually, we have to talk to the Shia because the Sunni have been our buddies for too long, which is so wrong, you know, to have that prism of sectarianism and looking at entire countries or groups. Like the amount of times you would hear Barack Obama say the Sunni Arabs and the Shia. It's like what is this identity that's being imposed? Or you know the Shia being imposed on people and really pushing this kind of sectarian, religious agenda.
And so I think that is part of trying to explain what that administration came with. Of course, they will say that their biggest concern was the nuclear issue, which frankly in the region, you know, sitting in countries where having a nuclear power in Iran is hugely problematic, people understand that. But this idea of trying—again, I think Obama came to things very much theoretically. And theoretically, it's the nuclear program. So if we isolate it from everything else and we just negotiate on that and you deal with that, then you can deal with other things. It doesn't work that way. If only life were that simple, if only politics was that simple, especially in this part of the world that you can just isolate and decide this is the only issue I want to talk about. So I think it was partly that.
I think for the Trump administration, a big part of it is that there were people in the military who served in Iraq but also served in Afghanistan, but particularly in Iraq who have said to me that more of our buddies, our men died by IEDs that were planted on the road by Iranian-backed militias, more than the other side, let's say. And they wanted to put an end to it, and I think for many of them, they fought in Iraq, and they felt like we've lost Iraq to Iran. And we're going to bring it back now. Whether they were actually able to deliver, when they went through the hard politics, this is the problem. You have to get involved in the politics. You have to send envoys? that are willing to go through the hassle of working at the minutia of these things. I don't think they really went that far, but I think that was a distinction. The people who were in those administrations were very different.
KH: So Mina, it strikes me that much of this conversation that we're having now revolves around issues of foreign policy and rightly so, I think. But I want to ask a question about how you think the region relates to American society? So this election has clearly revealed that the United States is a divided country. More and more people talk about two Americas. Is it your view that the region identifies with one more than the other? And I know this is a very general question, so I leave it to you to parse it however way you want. But I’m very curious. Do you see a distinction between Arab elites as they relate to these two Americas? And Arab general public opinion, especially the youth, and how they relate to what’s happening in terms of the changes
in American society?
MO: Karim great question. Okay I’m going to approach it in two different ways, and I hope I’m going to capture what you're asking me. So one is there a difference between elites and the people in terms of how they view the United States. Yes, and that's also divided because I think you do have some young Arabs who still feel an affinity towards the United States. They’ve either studies there or their parents to be there or like the idea of American culture and what it stands for in the society and the fact that, you know, you can go and, you know, make an American dream and so forth. I think there's that, but there's another Arab youth that's actually quite resentful of American foreign policy and even in their society, don't see a lot of the things that people who know the United States or who appreciate, kind of like the variety that isn't in society. And so actually, [they] are quite—I wouldn't say anti-American. I think that's the wrong term. But they're quite cynical about it and think, you know, better if the United States is in decline. Or if they say it's going away. Ahsan, let it go, like it's better for us. So I think there is that division.
But then on the elite side, for sure, I think the vast majority of world rulers in the in the region want to be in the good books of the United States, want to have a relationship with somebody, you know, a president that's not going to lecture them on human rights, how they should be ruling, and so forth. I think they find it insulting, and I think they, again, point to well look at your own problems in the United States now. And so, they actually feel emboldened to say yeah deal with your own problems. Don't come to us. And so they see these societal divisions, problems, you know, everything from the protest movements to, you know, the rules of dealing with COVID-19 and everything. So I think there's been a change of the dynamic there. How long it will last? I don't know. I think unless the United States pulls itself up again, there will be that sense of I don't think your own place to lecture us.
I want to just approach it from another point, which is this idea of democracy and the United States being some sort of beacon. I think, for again, that that has changed. It's not in the same way, and there is for some young Arabs, a disappointment in that because actually they still think we want to aspire to that. And they like things that they see in universities, research, technology. This idea that you can actually make something happen. The United States, you can make something of yourself. They think that still is there. There is that sense that you can. It is the land of kind of dreams. But at the same time, that splits of society of seeing people shouting, you know, wanting the Muslim ban, being xenophobic, not open to refugees, and that's why Canada has such a good reputation now. You know, America’s loss is Canada's gain because almost that respect and kind of aspiration, I think, now goes towards countries like Canada, New Zealand recently with its leadership, more than the United States.
TM: That's such an interesting observation because I certainly think you're right when you're talking about the average Arab citizens view of the United States. But we know that the Arab leadership loves the administration that implemented the Muslim ban and did all these things that you say are American popularity with the average Arab. And I understand why the relations between Arab leaders in the United States are so good. As you said, it's because they feel that Trump's transactional nature, which I might find as leading to kind of unpredictable behaviors, these leaders have decided, no they can deal with that. And they can understand that because it's just about what's the price? So I guess the question though is if you are right that the average Arab citizen is less enamored of the United States now because of some of the things that the Trump administration did, and they're seeing their leaders so cozy with the Trump administration and doing things like the Abraham accords and other kind of Trump initiatives, does that actually mean that the Arab citizens might actually think less of their leaders or be a little bit more disgruntled with their leaders because of this of this gap, in terms of how they perceive the United States?
MO: Honestly Tarek, I don't think we can talk about the Arab citizen. I mean if you speak to regular Iraqis— again I go back to Iraq, don't kill me. If you speak to regular Iraqis, their thought process is so different from what your average Emirati is thinking because what they're going through is completely different and what their countries are delivering for them is so different and what their leader is delivering is so different. So I think it's an element of your trust in your leadership and from that, who they're making alliances with, what decisions they're making—all of that. And unfortunately, in too many of our Arab countries, there isn't that trust in leadership that they actually know what they're doing.
And in certain countries, a very small minority, where there is genuinely legitimacy through competence and because leaders are able to deliver, for instance, is repeatedly time after time, and they're challenged, there is that trust. That okay, if you think Trump is the ally we need to have or actually if you think Xi is the ally we need to have or Putin is the ally we need, we trust you because you you've got it figured out. There are very few Arab leaders who can claim that. They do exist, but there are a few ones who can do that, and unfortunately in other parts of the Arab World, it is that relationship the United States that feels like, you know, and that's changed. But you know, for many years, it felt like you're actually only in your position because the Americans are backing you. Americans take their hands off; you will crumble. Now again, I think in the last 10, 11 years, a lot of that has changed in the region. That it's there. So I think for the average Arab citizen, we are going through so much that that thought process almost has become like a talking point, water cooler conversation, but actually doesn't touch people so much because the issues that people are dealing with domestically, exacerbated in this year of course with COVID-19 and the economic woes. But I don't think it really delegitimizes leaders.
TM: So you know, it's funny. Last week, we spoke to the former prime minister, and I guess
he was also former vice president of your country, Ayad Allawi. And you know, he was spinning for us what he wants the United States to do, and one of the things that was really important to him was that the United States really needs to finally solve the Palestinian issue. You know, the Abraham accords aren't going to do it. We can't ignore the Palestinians etc. And your comments lead me to think that you would probably say he was mouthing an old piety of the Arab world. But the fact of the matter is, again you know, per your diagnosis, Arabs don't really care about that issue so much. And as long as their government is competent and whatever you want to do on this issue, go ahead and do it.
MO: No I don't think that's true about Palestine. That's not what I was saying, but I was saying about their relationship with Trump, so that's different.
TM: Okay, but what about this particular issue?
MO: Yeah okay. So Abraham Accords is different. You didn't ask your question directly about the Abraham Accords.
TM: I included it in my question!
MO: Yeah, look. I think the Abrahamic Accords is different, and I think it's different because it's not about does Palestine matter or not. It's about— and this really pains me to say that actually
the Arab world has failed the Palestinians repeatedly time after time after time. And I think
it's easy to say, you know, if it wasn't for the Abraham Accords, we were going in the right direction. I mean it is a mess. It has been a mess for decades. I think the Palestinians have been sold out time and again by the very people who claim to defend them. You know, Ayad Allawi who I know, and I have a lot of respect for. So I’m not going to comment on his commentary, but all I will say is that so many Arab leaders will, you know, wax lyrical about Palestine and importance of Palestine and have done zero for the Palestinians. And it became so convenient to say, you know, that's what brings Arab unity.
When the Abraham Accords were signed, I was interviewed on the BBC, and they brought with me somebody I really respect. I won't mention who it is, but you know, people may have seen this interview. So I really respect —said, you know, Abraham Accords, Emiratis. I promise you said this live on TV. So the Emiratis broke Arab unity, and I almost burst out laughing on television. And I was like what seriously? Like you say up until this moment the Arabs are united? And I’m saying it lightly to you because we're having this conversation, but it breaks my heart. Like guys come on. Like please let's get real. Let's be honest. And again, this goes back to the transactional relationships with Trump. It's with saying things clearly and saying actually this is where we're at. This is the reality of it. On the Abraham Accords, this is, you know, an Emirati decision. We've seen the Bahrainis doing similar things. The Sudanese are doing similar things. And they're not claiming to say we no longer care about Palestine. Jerusalem doesn't matter. U.S. security council resolutions don't matter, but U.S. security council resolutions have been trampled back and forth by people, and nobody seems to be doing anything about it. And so I don't think in any way the average Arab says it doesn't care about Palestine. I think the average Arab citizen really can't deal with the slogans anymore and can't deal with it saying that if we just ignore that problem, it's going to resolve itself. And meanwhile, we'll feel good about ourselves because we say we care about it. So what have we done about it?
KH: You know, Mina I hear from what you're saying, a very, what I think, healthy dose of Arab introspection about the Palestinian issue. So I want to build on that and ask you a broad question about how the Arab world can fill this vacuum to deal with the region's problems. A lot of the criticism in Arab discourse towards the United States is very legitimate. I mean Arabs criticized the United States on issues of foreign policy, but the criticism from the American side, and you heard this especially during the Obama administration, is well, we're not seeing much leadership from the Arab world on these problems. We're not seeing an Arab vision to deal with issues, such as Iran's nuclear program, the conflict in Syria, the Palestinian issue, the situation in Iraq. You know, where is the Arab leadership on these issues? Do you feel that there is now a changed situation, in which that there is an Arab momentum to address these issues? And if so, what role should the Arabs seek from the United States to support that leadership to support that vision in dealing with the region's problems?
MO: You know, Karim, I think that you're right that an Arab voice is missing. And one of our biggest troubles in the region is that we've never been able to come together and actually say let's be united, not in slogans. Let's be united in mutual interests and benefits. Let's find where are those scores. And again, you know, people have said this so many times, and it's so true. If we were to look at labor markets, if we were talking about food security, if we were to talk about, you know, customs regulations, all these things if the Arab world of Arab leaders at different times had actually come together and said how can we build those infrastructures because people to people we’re so close. But really, it's the politics and so forth. It's putting that infrastructure to say actually our combined future together brings us closer together than trying to undercut each other or hurt each other.
And the sad thing is now we have countries from within themselves fighting each other. And again, you look at Libya. You look at Syria. You look at Yemen. You look at Iraq. You look at Lebanon. And well, yes, some of it is external intervention, and it is other countries. But at the end of the day, unfortunately, people from within their own countries like the Palestinians, not being able to draw a line and say, you know what? I don't agree with you, but I’m going to find a way to work with you because we need to save our countries and then we need to save our region, And unfortunately, we haven't had that. And again, you know, I studied history, and part of the reason I studied history was to be able to be a journalist to try and figure out what on earth happened and how are we here. And the more you learn about the history, and the modern history of our region is—unfortunately, there were so many opportunities where we could come together. But instead, leaders pulled apart, and whether it's competition, whether it's jealousy, or whatever it is—rivalries. And we continue to live through that.
So again, as somebody who wishes I could say the Arab world should come together, it unfortunately doesn't. The Arab League in theory should play that role. It doesn't and hasn't been able to. However, if we were to say a miracle happens, Arab leaders got together and actually said let's figure this out, let's not be broken. Because actually if you think about the human resources, the natural resources, the strategic location that we're in, can make us one of the strongest, if not the strongest region in the world. This is what we would want from the United States.
I think what they should be telling the United States is you have strategic interests here, and we know what they are. One is the continued supply of oil and energy supplies from the region, even if the United States is self-sufficient. They need a world economy that works and that means the continued flow of these energy resources. And United States cares about terrorism and extremism, and United States cares about ensuring Israel's place in the region. And those are the three major strategic interests of the United States. And okay, based on that, what do we as the Arab world want? We want stability. And how does that stability come about? We want technology and R&D, and we want to be able to rise up and meet—I mean the technological changes are happening in the world, and we are just recipients. Very few countries in the region, and the UAE is one of them that actually doesn't just want to be a recipient, wants to be part of that huge change that we're going through. And so we want you as the United States in the world, but also, we want you to —yes Israel is strategically important for you and yes you want to fight terrorism at the same time. It can’t be at the expense of our countries, and it can't be at the expense of the people of those regions. So this is what we need to maintain our stability and etc.
But unfortunately, I don't think we're going to get to that point where you're going to have the leaders of the 22 Arab countries come together. I mean it would be great if the leaders of one of the countries that are currently conflict-ridden could come together and agree amongst themselves, let alone to bring the whole region together. So you know, I’m despondent. I guess part of it is because I see the opportunity, and we miss every opportunity that's possible out there. But also, you know, there is a fatigue in the United States from the Arab world and from the problems of the region. So it's very hard to turn around now and come to an administration that's going to be dealing with the impact of COVID-19, the economy, internal divisions. People, you know, Arabs are aware of all these problems that are facing United States. Turn around to them and say hey, come fix our problems when they have so many of their own. And also, we've kind of missed every opportunity that was given to the region,
TM: So Mina, we want to open it up to questions from the audience, but let me just conclude with a question on Iraq that I think follows up on Karim's question to you. It may even be the same question asked in a more pointed way. So you know, you wrote a column about the American election and its impact on Iraq. You called Iraq the country where U.S. elections matter as much as they do in America, and where you ended up in that article, you said look whoever wins the presidency he should “aim to support the Iraqi state and its institutions as the most effective way forward.” And I guess what I want to ask you is what would that look like exactly and how would you convince American policymakers and the American people to bear the costs of that? Why should they bear the costs of “supporting the Iraqi state and its institutions”?
MO: Okay wow, Tarek. You know, you say this is going to be the last question before you open up. I’m going to talk a lot here so forgive me. Just cut me off because when it's on Iraq and what we can do to help Iraq, I can't stop. So cut me off when you need to. Okay, so first of all, bearing the costs. I mean I know this is repeated forever in the United States about the financial cost. I mean the personnel cost of the lives lost. That's something I respect, and I wouldn't, you know, try to belittle that. The financial cost. First of all, a lot of the money that the Americans spent were going to American contractors and to the American military, and there are many weapons makers that became very rich, and there are lots of contractors became rich. It wasn't like America came and spent trillions for the Iraqi people, and they didn't know how to spend it. So that's just the first in terms of the financial cost. I don't really think there's a big cost. On the contrary, I think there are a lot of very rich Americans out of the war, Iraq and the ensuing conflict.
However, what does it look like when I say support the institutions? What happens time and again is that we get a prime minister, and the United States like he's the one, and it's always a he. He's the one. We're going to be able to work with him. He's a reformer. Let's find three ministers in that government that we like, and they speak in English so we can get on with them. Half the reason they couldn't get on with Maliki at the beginning is because he doesn't speak good English, so it frustrated people. But anyway, let's find these people that, you know, we can see eye to eye, and we're going to support them. And they're going to make the change. And in that process, we'll undercut institutions, won't work. Okay well, what is the legal thing to do here? For example, let's look at this grouping. The Sunnis should do this. The Kurds should do that.
Whereas actually, if you want to support the institutions to say how does Iraq, the country work, we will only speak to the foreign minister. I mean, everybody's the foreign minister in Iraq, the head of parliament is a foreign minister in Iraq. So they undercut. And by the way, the Americans aren't the only ones, but they're the worst at it. They undercut the actual institutions by dealing with the people that they're comfortable with, and they play them off each other. So stop doing that. Think about what is the long-term institution building in the country that doesn't rely on one person, two people that you get away. Then they change, and they're not what you hoped for, China being a prime example in others where it's like it's not the characters guys. It's the actual country, and it's just that the first thing. The second one—
TM: But Mina, your institutions are weak. You know, that's a hallmark of a country with weak institutions, that there are different players who have power, and the United States should deal with all of them. If the United States followed your policy prescription and said okay, we're only going to deal with the foreign minister. Well Russia isn't going to do that. Russia is going to talk to all of the people in Iraq who have power. China isn't going to do that. So your prescription is not realistic.
MO: Okay so first of all, they are unusually weak because the Americans took apart Iraq's institutions, 2003, so first. Second of all, you can still do that. We have a president, and we have a prime minister. Deal with the president and with the prime minister, and every other country actually doesn't hold half the space that the United States has. Only the Iranians hold that sway. The Iranians have their guys on the ground. So I disagree. I think if you deal the president and the prime minister and everybody goes through them, it would actually support them.
Second thing I would say is that you can help Iraq's institutions by ensuring that whether it's money or support or so forth, actually goes to state structures. For example, when the United States decided that it's going in the coalition to fight ISIS, suddenly they were arming everybody. Like if I went and had five of my chums and said hey we’re a new militia, and we're fighting ISIS. Here you go. We're going to support you. We're going to ensure money comes to you. We're going to ensure that weapons come to you. That's how you undercut the state. Whereas if you say actually, we only believe in the army and you guys can do whatever you want— I used to have American generals argue with me that militias—and I’ll probably, look at us. We have the national reserve. I’m like, these are not reserved forces. These are actual militias on the ground. So there was there was an active idea of we can get different groupings and let them fight out against each other.
The third, and again I really can't take very long time. The third thing I’d say when I say support the institution is look at the civil service, help with capacity building there. That never happened. Bring in the expertise the United States does have. And they're not the only ones. The Europeans equally bring in the expertise that is sustainable. Don't say, okay we're going to bring 10 people, train them, and let it, and that's it. No, make it sustainable. Help with that. It's long, and it's boring, and it will take a long time to help with the educational facilities and to support Iraqis that are trying to reform parliament, our constitution, which was brought in in 2005. It's been 15 years. It's meant to be reformed. Nothing's happened. Put political pressure. Americans have incredible power if they wish to project it. Put political pressure and say reform that constitution that has half of its articles up for debate. So I would say, I think there's a lot the U.S. can do, and it has much more power, not military. It has much more power and politics and influence than it can be bothered to use because it is easier to just say get that guy. We kind of know him. We'll tell him what to do and be done with that.
TM: All right. We are now at the end of our time, unfortunately. I think that we could probably, Mina, talk to you for several more hours about any of the topics that we've raised. But I believe our audience now completely understands why you're one of the most distinctive and sought-after voices today on Middle Eastern affairs, and I dare say that if you had decided to make a side living being a commentator on American affairs. we'd probably tune in to you before we tuned into most people who talk about the United States. So I want to thank Karim, and I think
on Karim's behalf, I hope that once this COVID- 19 nightmare is over you will visit us, both in Cairo where Karim is and in Cambridge where I am. So I hope we'll have that opportunity. Thank you, Mina.
MO: Thank you, Tarek. I just want to say I’m genuinely honored that you asked and thank you for all the great questions. And I have huge respect for what you're doing, so thank you for having these conversations.
TM: Thank you so much, Mina. And thank you everybody for joining us. It is really—your questions are fantastic, and we hope that you'll join us next week when we speak to the Lebanese journalist Raghida Dergham. But for now, let me again thank you so much Mina and thank you everybody for coming. Bye now.
Outro text: Thank you for listening. This has been Middle East Matters. Ours hosts are Tarek Masoud, and Karim Haggag with special thanks to Daniel and Patrick Lazour for providing music from their musical “We Live in Cairo.” We’ll be launching the full series in 2021, so make sure to subscribe to Middle East Matters on Apple podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you stream your podcasts!